The most visible success of the UN system has been to foster a multilateral structure of international governance that has proved resilient since World War II. However, this structure has failed to provide a financing mechanism to help developing countries achieve the structural transformations required for broad-based economic growth. Indeed, the global South has also had many chances to reorder the international financing system but has failed thus far to do so. The global distribution of power remains with the USA and the West; even rising China plays by the contract enforcement rules of the North in terms of global economic governance. Another critical reason why financing has not been readily available despite the magnitude of capital flows between developed and developing economies is that it comes with conditions that induce little ‗effort' to result in capability development. Policies should be devised to overcome this weakness, but they are unlikely within a multilateral framework. However, if the USA and China agree to work together on alternative multilateral systems promoted by the global South, the potential for positive change increases.
Key Words: multilateral development financing; capability development; global economic governance; global South; South-South cooperation; United Nations; NIEO The multilateral system has not worked to achieve structural transformation and broad-based economic growth in the global South, a reality that contrasts with other topics under discussion in 1945 and today. For instance the system has worked successfully to provide solutions to humanitarian or public health crises but has drawn up short in terms of financing structural transformation. The analysis suggests that growth was a powerful normative aspiration for the UN's multilateral framework at the outset, but it has not been realised to the extent hoped for by the global South.
The UN Charter was ahead of its time and highlighted goals of achieving full employment and higher standards of economic and social progress and development globally.
While the world organization began with a development mandate, it was starved of the authority and resources to realise the lofty aims articulated in the Charter. Rather than the UN, Western powers vested responsibility for global economic governance in the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) because they could control these financial organisations and thus protect their economic interests. Developed countries driving the economic agenda saw issues of currency stabilisation, full employment and reversal of beggar-thy-neighbour trade policies as their mandates for economic growth and development. The idea that development needed to encompass rapid catch up for the rest of the globe was never part of that multilateral agenda.
Also the United Nations, and more specifically the General Assembly, was not trusted by Western powers to handle significant financial issues pertinent for developing countries. 
Today's global economy
Contemporary financing initiatives from developing countries reflect a changing global order and should be taken seriously. The challenges that they face are, however, no less daunting than the ones confronting the BWI-designing policies so that the probability of failure is reduced. That challenge is thorny because the compulsory tools needed to ensure that policy is successfully implemented are extremely hard to introduce into policy design.
Where such compulsions seem to have resulted in transformational growth as in South Korea have resulted from the specific characteristics of the political settlement of that country or the distribution of power among organisations. 1 The biggest challenge for multilateralism, even for the NDB and AIIB, remains financing for capability development in such a way that productive firms or organisations can be established to provide gainful and broad-based employment to facilitate structural transformation. But such a result requires appropriate incentives and enforcement mechanisms, and the latter is linked to state capacity, which makes a multilateral approach problematic because it is fraught with collective action problems. There also remains another problem: who oversees governments that discipline firms?
That challenge requires assistance from credible financial institutions so that investments can be channelled to potential growth sectors while disciplining the use of resources so that they are not misappropriated or wasted-a substantial concern for donors globally. The appropriate institutional rules have to be consistent with the political settlements in which they are operating so that the conditions of financing are feasible and the recipients are compelled to establish organisations that are competitive. Such a global structure of financial institutions does not exist, which explains why lenders in general do not feel safe in lending to countries and firms in countries without adequate organisational structures to engage in competitive, productive activities.
The significant demand for a ‗no-strings attached' technology policy, or the demand for greater economic transfers without conditions attached to them, by the NIEO which is discussed later, was a demand for economic self-sufficiency by developing countries 2 as well as for redistribution from richer to poorer countries as the most productive technologies were then and remain now in industrialised countries. However, such a policy provided no guarantee that the learning and catching up required for industrialisation would actually take place because the policy does not encapsulate any monitoring of the ‗effort' by recipient countries to achieve stated goals . 3 Aid is of course another form of financing for developing countries. While opinion is divided on aid effectiveness, there is little doubt that the amount of aid available is too little to jump-start the process of structural transformation-going from a pre-capitalist to a broad-based, inclusive modern capitalist economy. Indeed very little aid is now given for industrial development, with most overseas development assistance (ODA) going to areas like health, education, governance and humanitarian assistance. 4 These are no doubt critically important areas but the long-term solution for developing countries can only be self-sufficiency resulting from higher productivity, higher value added, and employment from manufacturing. The role of manufacturing is explained later, but if there is to be another multilateral moment post-Bretton Woods this would be the focus-enabling job creation through policies that are designed to be feasible for developing countries to implement while also providing adequate returns to donor countries. The requirement is for richer countries to provide firms in developing countries with incentives to learn and grow-hence, conditional financing. This is not a simple but rather subtle approach because a disciplining mechanism from the ‗outside' addresses problems ‗inside'-a difficult task to engineer in sovereign states. Essentially donors have to ensure their funds are being used for capability development rather than being captured. Making sure conventional ODA for service delivery or strengthening audit institutions is difficult enough.
Yet designing financing by which firms actually gain organisational capability and become competitive in world markets without any subsidy is likely to be even more arduous because conventional economic models that focus on managing risk are insufficient for identifying the institutional requirements for managing learning, which requires experimentation and understanding local political realities. 6 Alternative and unconventional policies are more thinkable today because the longstanding consensus about market-driven development is increasingly contested. 
The UN and origins of the underdevelopment discourse
General Assembly resolution 198 (III) was adopted in 1948, three years after the UN's founding, with a request that ECOSOC give ‗further and urgent consideration to the whole problem of the economic development of the underdeveloped countries in all its aspects'. The problématique was far different from the challenge of achieving full employment that confronted developed countries in the postwar period. Despite being damaged by war, or at least in the case of the USA, disturbed by war, these economies had underlying levels of productivity that could be potentially restored with Keynesian policies of achieving full employment. 8 Most of the early members of the UN from the global South had a very different problem-one of structural transformation, which implied policies for improving productivity as opposed to restoring full employment and existing productivity.
However, the critical feature of Keynesian thought prevalent among countries of the North and South at the time was that national governments had an essential role. 9 The multilateral system at this point was primarily the overarching economic governance framework of the Bretton Woods system dominated by the USA and its allies.
The United Nations in those early days was to be the leading organisation to promote economic growth. UN Charter Article 55 lays out the aims of full employment and ‗conditions of economic and social progress and development' among other aims. The BWI were not mentioned in this article, making clear that it was the UN, and more specifically ECOSOC, that would be responsible for setting the global policy mandate for economic growth. 10 At the San Francisco conference, delegates understood the word ‗economic' to include international trade, finance, economic reconstruction; and ‗economic problems' to include international access to capital goods and raw materials. The Preparatory Commission took over the task of fine tuning the details to be presented to ECOSOC; and a key recommendation was to set up the Economic and Employment Commission, which went beyond full employment and the prevention of economic instability to encompass economic development of underdeveloped areas. The Preparatory Commission had also recommended setting up an Economic Development Committee that was expressly concerned with methods of increasing productivity and production in less developed economies.
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The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had no specific mandates for productivity growth in developing countries. 12 The postwar conferences in Bretton Woods in 1945, Geneva in 1947 and Havana in 1948 13 had economic agendas that
were not concerned with structural change, the process of transforming a country from an informal, often agrarian economy to one with a productive and high-wage, high value-added, manufacturing-based economy. Given their much greater levels of productivity, the West's concerns were currency stabilisation and full employment. It was up the newly independent countries of the global South to try and find solutions to the problem of structural transformation.
The critical question was and remains how to fund development and productivity growth. Newly decolonised developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s had scant access to capital whether through domestic mobilisation, foreign direct investment or export earnings.
Such financing had to come from developed countries, which were the main donors to the BWI and therefore the main decision makers in terms of the disbursements. What was not yet called ‗South-South cooperation' was nonetheless thwarted from the outset. There were, however, more successful and more visible efforts from within the multilateral UN system to put in place an agenda of redistribution. The NIEO discussed in the next section was the apogee of this phase of cooperation through which solidarity among developing countries focused on economic sovereignty. But the pushback from the North was always present and robust. For instance, the USA and the UK opposed setting up the UN Special Fund for Economic Development because it was to be administered by the General Assembly, in which already the numbers favoured developing countries. In the end, the financing functions were channelled to the International Development Association (IDA), a sister organisation of 16 and is well recognised in many other sources. The NIEO lost momentum due to concerted opposition from developed countries and a breaking of ranks by OPEC countries that were not willing to provide either oil at concessional prices or financing (from their trade surplus) at concessional rates. 30 In the 34 It should however be noted that , the problem with state-led growth was not state involvement but policies that were too ambitious given the state's capacity to enforce them.
One reason for the NIEO's failure was that it was more a demand for political recognition than a realistic policy framework; in addition, there were enormous collective action problems within the coalition of the global South. It began by helping developing countries deal with commodity prices, especially oil, but then it lost its way. Major oil producers such as Saudi Arabia were willing to break ranks and not supply oil at concessional rates to other developing countries, which in fact were bankrupted in many cases by the debt resulting from skyrocketing oil prices. The other crucial reason was that the NIEO did not link the demand for more financing and on better terms with a credible strategy for making the financing effective in terms of delivering such results as greater competitiveness, productivity and diversification. There was little interest from developed countries to abandon the successful contract-enforcement arrangements of the World Bank with debtor developing countries. In addition, the World Bank had successfully created infrastructure in countries where little had existed under existing contracting arrangements for financing.
The NIEO attempted structural transformation, a process tied to the internal political dynamics of a country. Policies attempting to change the structure of the economy would tend to move the economy from a pre-or proto-capitalist structure to a more formal broadbased (or relatively less iniquitous) capitalistic structure. Hence, such a transformation is about changing the distribution of benefits across the economy; and it creates winners and losers as those benefiting from extra incomes or ‗rents' in the older economic structure would either lose out or have to invest in becoming competitive. This process is an intensely political one in developing countries as governments too are tied to economic factions or groups on whom they rely for support. If the impact on their interests is negative, such groups either strongly oppose change or simply block it. 35 Developing country governments have been unwilling to interfere in one other's political structures, yet another reason why the NIEO failed.
The NIEO's rejection by the West and the BWI was the result of a Cold War reality by which the BWI represented Western interests (the primary financial sources) and quickly sought to reassert their primacy and maintain their position as the superior alternative to the communist bloc. 36 The hope was that asking for corrective economic measures would somehow provide a foundation from which to build greater political unity among the global South. 37 The UN General Assembly was an apt forum to host a multilateral movement through which developing countries challenged Western dominance of the global order.
While the BWI remained largely within the purview of Western interests, the UN had both a normative and practical basis for creating the NIEO because of its membership and organisational structure as well as its founding principles.
The future of South-South economic cooperation: brick by BRICS?
The Until emerging economies demonstrate a willingness to play a global enforcement role, their greater ability to provide finance will not on its own give them the ability to change the ground rules of global finance that the IMF and the World Bank follow and that appear closely aligned with Western financial interests. They remain dominant because these global rules are widely perceived to be enforceable. Any threat of a breakdown is likely to invoke moves to shore up the system by many of the (still) most powerful states in the world, and this perception leads participants in global markets to adhere to these rules-whether from the North or the global South. The relative power of the US-led West is less than it used to be, but the challenges are not yet enough for an alternative global political settlement to be discernible. Thus, while China is certainly becoming much more powerful in its economic might, the paradox is that the effects on the global financial architecture are less dramatic and slower than one might imagine.
Two reasons stand out as explanations. Even though China is the second largest economy in the world and is poised to take over the leading position from the USA in the next few decades, per capita income in China (about $ 7,600 in 2014) still lags far behind the USA (about $ 55,000 in that year).Thus, even when China overtakes the USA in aggregate GDP, it will remain far behind in per capita terms, which means that it will be a long time before China can match the USA in productivity and innovation. Thus, it is unlikely that China will achieve technological leadership over the USA within the next half or even full century. Moreover, China does not have an alternative ideology that it wants the world to adopt unlike the USA at the end of World War II. China does not have an interest in spreading its particular political and economic ideology or to define a global financial architecture based on alternative economic or political principles.
On the contrary, it appears willing to engage with any country from which it can benefit, without attempting to change its internal workings; and China appears largely willing to work within the existing global financial architecture with only minor modifications.
Washington's tacit support is still important for Beijing and is and likely to remain important because that would provide greater credibility of contract enforcement for both borrowers and suitable. However, they will also have to ensure contract enforcement.
It would in theory be in China's interest to foster a new multilateralism that helps other developing economies to accelerate their development, to adopt and adapt technologies for rapid productivity growth. While such growth can happen in any sector, in most developing countries manufacturing drives productivity. As explained earlier, manufacturing provides greater scope for achieving dynamic increasing returns to scale (higher growth leading to higher productivity growth that leads to further growth, a virtuous cycle). It is also easier to organise manufacturing than agricultural growth in developing countries. Rapid productivity growth in agriculture necessarily means moving away from peasant agriculture to ‗capitalist' farming on large tracts of land. Given the problems of contested land rights and the political difficulty of aggregating small parcels in developing countries on which marginal farmers subsist, high rates of productivity growth in agriculture are typically very difficult to achieve. Services can appear to be an attractive alternative, but high-value services require large pools of very educated people. Some countries such as India had such pools and underemployed people at particular points in their history for very specific reasons, but the vast majority of people in developing countries have levels of skills that are too low to drive service-driven productivity growth. In contrast, it has been possible for even low and lower-middle income countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam to develop successful manufacturing sectors in such segments as garments. The challenge for most developing countries is to diversify their manufacturing and move up the productivity ladder.
That challenge requires assistance from credible financial institutions so that investments can be channelled to potential growth sectors while disciplining the use of resources to avoid misappropriation or waste. Appropriate institutional rules have to be consistent with local politics so that the conditions of financing are credible and recipients feel compelled to put in high levels of effort in developing economic entities that can be competitive. 38 Such a global structure of financial institutions clearly does not exist, which explains why sources of finance often do not feel safe in lending to countries and firms in which the borrowing firms do not already have organisational structures that can engage in competitive productive activities. 39 The development of a global financial architecture that would make these types of financial flows easier would require multilateral action, but it would also require new thinking about the development of monitoring and enforcement capacities of global financial institutions engaged in development lending well beyond the 1945 debates at Bretton Woods.
Conclusion
The global South has made several attempts to change the global order that has structured development finance, but with very limited success. One reason has been the interests and dominance of the North but another equally important reason has been the failure to articulate and identify the conditions under which effective development financing could dramatically accelerate productivity growth and structural transformation in developing countries. It is increasingly clear, however, that a sustainable world system can only be possible thorough an overhaul of current financing. Ultimately, economic governance is as much about global political capacities because global economic governance has to be underpinned by agreements and enforcement. Hence, the dissonance between global US and Chinese interests make it unlikely for a comprehensive pact to be reached soon about global financing arrangements. However if they were to agree on incremental changes to the financial architecture, developmental prospects and outcomes would benefit. Even such changes on the margin would still be of a magnitude to ensure a more dramatic global financial system for development.
point, all fertile land would be already used, and the remaining infertile land would produce less and less. 25 
